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Introduction
This case examined whether a British law requiring the consent of
both genetic parents to the implantation of embryos created through in
vitro fertilization (IVF) is consistent with Articles 2, 8, and 14 of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights. This case specifically determined
whether a British woman could, over her former boyfriend's objections, use
frozen embryos that she had created with him to impregnate herself after
losing her ovaries to cancer. The case also determined generally whether
state parties to the European Convention on Human Rights could require
t J.D. candidate, Cornell Law School, expected 2008; B.A., University of Florida,
2005. 1 would like to thank the ILJ editors for their advice and assistance on matters of
style and substance which was invaluable to my production of this work, in particular
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sperm-donor consent to IVF treatment without violating citizens' rights to
private life and freedom from discrimination on the basis of disability.
This was the United Kingdom's first major case involving parties to an IVF
treatment. '
In 2002,2 Natallie Evans3 of Wiltshire, England began an action in the
Family Division of the High Court of Justice of England and Wales4 to
prevent a fertility clinic from destroying frozen embryos that she had cre-
ated through a 2000 IVF procedure with her then boyfriend, Howard John-
ston. Evans and Johnston ended their relationship in 2002, and Johnston
withdrew his consent to use the embryos, placing the clinic under a legal
obligation to destroy them. Evans argued that the British Fertilisation and
Embryology Act 1990, which mandated the destruction of the embryos,
was incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights
because it denied the embryos' right to life, interfered with Evans's right to
private life, and discriminated against women who rely on IVF treatment to
have children vis-a-vis women who do not rely on such treatment. The
Family Division dismissed claims that the Act violated the European Con-
vention. 5 The Court of Appeal of England and Wales again dismissed
Evans's claims, including her human rights claims. On appeal, the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights 6 deferred to the judgments of the Family
Division and the Court of Appeal on the questions of the embryos' right to
life and the regulation of IVF treatment because these claims were within
the margin of appreciation. The court also agreed with the domestic
courts' judgments that any discrimination against women resulting from
the 1990 Act was justified.
A. Legal Background
The birth of the first child conceived through an IVF procedure caused
considerable scientific and ethical controversy in the United Kingdom.
7
The ensuing debate resulted in the British Parliament's enactment of the
1. Evans v. Amicus Healthcare Ltd., [2003] EWHC 2161 (Fam), 2004 2 W.L.R. 713,
717 (Eng.).
2. See id. at 716.
3. The cases do not use Evans's first name and refer to Johnston only as 'J." Their
full names can be found at The Family Law News Blog website. The Family Law News
Blog: Evans v. United Kingdom - Embryo Possession, http://familylaw.typepad.com/fam-
ily-law-news/2006/03/evans v_united_.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2007).
4. A useful chart detailing the structure of the English and Welsh court system
exists on the Her Majesty's Courts Service website. See Her Majesty's Court Service -
Structure of HMCS, http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/aboutus/structure/index.htm
(last visited Feb. 19, 2007).
5. See generally Evans, 2 W.L.R. 713.
6. The European Court of Human Rights is charged with enforcing the provisions
of the European Convention on Human Rights, a treaty signed by all members of the
Council of Europe. See European Court of Human Rights Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Applicants/nformation+for+applicants/
Frequently+asked+questions/.
7. Evans v. United Kingdom, 43 E.H.R.R. 21, 415 (2006), available at http://
www.echr.coe.int/echr/.
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Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990.8 The 1990 Act attempts to
navigate complex ethical and religious concerns surrounding artificial
means of procreation while remaining flexible enough to respond to rapid
medical and scientific technological developments. 9 In addition to general
rules regulating fertility treatment,10 the Act requires the consent of both
gamete" donors for the storage of embryos created through an IVF proce-
dure. 12 The 1990 Act allows either gamete donor to withdraw consent to
continued storage of IVF embryos until the embryo's implantation. 13
The law on this subject is far from uniform around the world. The
Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights contains a broad require-
ment that participants in medical procedures provide free and informed
consent. 14 Many European countries permit both parties to veto continua-
tion of an IVF procedure up to the point of the embryo's implantation,
while others limit the man's right to terminate the procedure depending
upon the stage the procedure has reached or the nature of the man's rela-
tionship with the female gamete donor. 15 In the United States, no federal
statute governs the question of withdrawal of consent to use IVF embryos
and few state legislatures have directly addressed the issue, making state
courts decisions the primary sources of American law on the subject. 16
8. Id. at 416. The 1990 Act was the result of the work of a Committee of Inquiry
and public consultation. Id. at 427. The 1990 Act contains various clauses and sched-
ules (or appendices), and this case primarily concerns itself with Schedule 3. For the
sake of simplicity and to avoid the use of unfamiliar terminology, this summary will
refer to the challenged law as the 1990 Act and not as any of its subdivisions except in
footnotes.
9. The policy considerations behind the 1990 Act were, as summarized by Judge
Wall at trial:
(1) the female right of self-determination in relation to a pregnancy; (2) the
primacy of consent accorded in the modern age to the need for freely given and
informed consent to medical interventions; (3) the period over which IVF takes
place; (4) the special significance of parenthood; (5) the interests of the child;
(6) equality of treatment between the parties; (7) the promotion of the efficacy
and use of IVF and related techniques; and (8) clarity and certainty in the rela-
tions between partners.
Evans, 2 W.L.R. at 755.
10. See generally Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37 (Eng.).
11. A "gamete" is a sperm or an egg that unites with its counterpart to produce an
organism. The courts consistently use this term to refer to Evans'a and Johnston's con-
tributions to the creation of the embryos. See Dictionary.com, Gamete, http://diction-
ary.reference.com/search?q=gamete (last visited Feb. 24, 2007).
12. See Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37, sched. 3, 1 5 (Eng.).
13. See id., sched. 3, 9[ 2.
14. See Evans, 43 E.H.R.R. at 422.
15. Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Sweden, Switzer-
land, and Turkey, either through legislation or clinical practice, grant male gamete
donors power to withdraw consent similar to that which exists in the United Kingdom.
Austria, Estonia, and Italy allow the male to withdraw consent only up to the point of
fertilization. In Hungary, a woman is entitled to proceed with the treatment even in the
face of divorce or death of her male partner unless the parties contract otherwise. In
Spain, men can only revoke consent if married to and living with the woman being
treated. Id. at 420.
16. The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that it would consider the intentions of
the parties or any agreements they may have made on the matter before balancing the
Cornell International Law Journal
Some state courts have relied on policy considerations surrounding repro-
ductive rights in making their decisions while others have turned to con-
tract law by deferring to instruments drafted by the parties at the time of
the original agreements to participate in the procedures.
17
B. Facts
In 2000, Evans and Johnston were engaged in treatment at the Bath
Assisted Conception Clinic because they experienced difficulties conceiv-
ing a child. 18 Having a biological child was Evans's "overwhelming ambi-
tion."19 During an examination at the clinic, doctors discovered that she
was developing ovarian cancer, and the only way she could conceive her
own child would be for Evans and Johnston to undergo an IVF procedure
because her ovaries had to be removed as quickly as possible.20 A nurse at
the clinic explained that under the 1990 Act, either party could withdraw
consent to the continued storage of embryos created through IVF.2 1 Evans
claims that she discussed the possibility of freezing some of her eggs for
future use, but she decided against it upon hearing that the Bath Assisted
Conception Clinic did not perform the procedure and that such a proce-
dure would have a low chance of success. Further, when speaking with the
nurse, Mr. Johnston assured Evans that they would not break up and that
he was willing to be a father.2 2 As required by the 1990 Act, the couple
signed forms indicating that they had received the relevant counseling and
understood that consent to the use of the embryos could be withdrawn
until they were used.2 3 The consent forms also indicated that Johnston
had consented to be treated "together" with Evans, and that he specifically
declined consent to allow the clinic to treat Evans with the embryos alone
or with someone else. 24 The procedure successfully created six embryos.
2 5
Evans and Johnston ended their relationship in 2002, but Evans argued
that following their breakup Johnston agreed that she could continue to
relative interests of the parties. Courts in New York and Washington have also held that
prior agreements by the parties take precedence, while Massachusetts and New Jersey
allowed a man and a woman respectively to order the termination of treatment in spite of
agreements to the contrary. See id. at 420-21 (citing Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588,
572 (1992); Kass v. Kass, 673 N.Y.S.2d 350 (1998); A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E. 2d 1051
(2000); J.B. v. M.B., 170 NJ. 9 (2001); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 146 Wash.2d 514 (2002)).
17. See id. at 421.
18. See id, at 411; BBC World News, It's My Only Chance to Have a Baby, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/2250799.stm (last visited Feb. 24, 2007).
19. Evans, 43 E.H.R.R. at 424.
20. See BBC World News, supra note 18.
21. See Evans, 43 E.H.R.R. at 411. The clinic staff did not recall having discussed
this with Evans but said that they would have told her that the clinic would not perform
such a procedure and that it would have a low chance of success. Evans, 2 W.L.R. at
731.
22. See Evans, 43 E.H.R.R. at 411-12.
23. Specifically, Johnston's portion of the agreement consisted of separate consents
to the use of his sperm to fertilize Evans's eggs and the storage of the embryos. Id. at
412.
24. Evans, 2 W.L.R. at 739-40.
25. See Evans, 43 E.H.R.R. at 412.
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use the embryos on the condition that she sign an agreement absolving
him of any financial or parental obligations to any children the procedure
produced, terms which she says she accepted. 26 Nevertheless, the couple
never signed such an agreement, 27 and in July of 2002 Johnston informed
the clinic that he no longer consented to the storage of the embryos and




Upon receiving notification from the clinic that the embryos would be
destroyed, Evans filed an action with the Family Division of the High
Court.29 Evans's action sought: (i) a declaration that Johnston could not
alter the consent he had originally given to the storage of the embryos; (ii)
an injunction requiring Johnston to restore his consent to the use of the
embryos; (iii) a declaration that the embryos could be stored for the entire
ten-year period permitted by the 1990 Act; (iv) a declaration that Evans
could use the embryos for the entirety of the storage period; (v) a declara-
tion that the challenged portion of the 1990 Act was incompatible with the
Human Rights Act 1998; and (vi) an order that the embryos be preserved
until the clinic changed its position and permitted her to use the
embryos.30 Evans also argued that her detrimental reliance on Johnston's
representations that he wanted to be a father and that they would not split
up estopped him from withdrawing his consent to the use of the
embryos.
3 1
Evans argued that the 1990 Act was incompatible with the European
Convention on four grounds: (i) it interfered with her rights to private and
family life under Article 8 of the Convention; (ii) it interfered with her right
to start a family under Article 12; (iii) it discriminated against Evans as a
disabled person requiring IVF treatment to get pregnant in violation of
Article 14; and (iv) it interfered with the embryo's right under Article 2 and
26. BBC World News, supra note 18. Such an agreement would have been void
under British law. Evans, 2 W.L.R. at 768 (citing the Child Support Act, 1991, c. 48
(Eng.)).
27. BBC World News, supra note 18.
28. Evans, 43 E.H.R.R. at 412.
29. Id.
30. Evans, 2 W.L.R. at 719. The Human Rights Act 1998 incorporates the provisions
of the European Convention on Human Rights into British law. See Rights Brought Home:
The Human Rights Bill, http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/hoffice/
rights/intro.htm. This case summary will therefore discuss the 1998 Act challenge as a
Convention challenge. The initial High Court proceeding was heard together with a
similar IVF consent challenge by another woman, Lorraine Hadley. Hadley's ex-hus-
band also withdrew his consent to use embryos created through an IVF procedure with
his sperm. Unlike Evans, Hadley had a daughter from a previous relationship (she had
since developed fertility problems) and did not appeal her case. BBC World News,
Woman 'Cannot use IVF Embryos', http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/3835291.stm (last
visited Feb. 24, 2007).
31. Evans, 2 W.L.R. at 720.
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any applicable rights it might have under Article 8.32
Johnston, on the other hand, contended that the 1990 Act gave him an
unconditional right to withdraw consent to the storage of the embryos up
to the point of use, and that use in this context meant implantation in
Evans.3 3 He further argued that rights under the Convention were not
involved here, and that even if they were, the interference with Evans's Arti-
cle 8 rights was justified in order to protect his own Article 8 rights.
3 4
The clinic did not take a position regarding Evans's claim, but it pro-
vided informative medical evidence.
35
The President of the Family Division 36 ordered that the Human Fer-
tilisation and Embryology Authority3 7 and the Secretary of State for
Health38 be joined as parties to the case because of its importance. 39 Both
parties argued that the 1990 Act barred Evans's claim.40 The two authori-
ties reiterated the arguments that the 1990 Act allowed Johnston to revoke
his consent and that the Act did not breach Convention rights. 4 1 They also
argued in the alternative that the consent given by Evans and Johnston was
consent to be treated together, and the couple's separation rendered that
consent no longer meaningful.
4 2
On October 1, 2003, Judge Wall of the Family Division dismissed
Evans's claim.43 Judge Wall addressed three issues: (i) whether the con-
sent given to being treated together could still be effective after the couple's
separation; (ii) whether the embryos had already been "used," making any
further consent from Johnston unnecessary; and (iii) whether the chal-
lenged section of the 1990 Act was incompatible with provisions of the
European Convention on Human Rights.
44
Having found no basis outside the Convention for a judgment in favor
of Evans, Judge Wall considered the Convention claims, which he believed
to be the most important parts of the case.
4 5
32. Id. at 719, 752.
33. Id. at 719.
34. Id. at 720.
35. See id.
36. The president, or head, of the Family Division was Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss.
She was succeeded in January 2005 by Sir Mark Potter. President of the Family Division
Appointment, http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page6902.asp.
37. The 1990 Act created the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority to
monitor, license, and regulate fertility clinics. http://www.hfea.gov.uk/cps/rde/xchg/
SID-3F57D79B-8A308198/hfea/hs.xsl/385.html.
38. The Secretary of State for Health heads the Department of Health, the govern-
ment department concerned with healthcare issues. FAQ's about the HFEA - Fertility
Treatment & Clinics, http://www.dh.gov.uk/Home/fs/en.




43. Id. at 781.
44. See generally id.
45. Id. at 751. Specifically, Evans's attorneys challenged § 12(c) of the Act (requir-
ing license to use embryos to comply with Schedule 3 of the 1990 Act) 9 6(3) of Sched-
ule 3 (requiring consent of both donors to use of embryos), 11 8(2) of Schedule 3
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B. Article 2 Claim
First, Judge Wall concluded that the challenged portions of the 1990
Act did not engage Article 2 of the Convention's guarantee that everyone
has a right to life as Evans's counsel asserted. 46 Evans's counsel argued
that while an embryo was not a human life, it nonetheless had a "qualified
right to life," aspects of which required allowing it to live as long as either
gamete donor wished and making it available for implantation. 4 7 While
Judge Wall was unable to find case law on the point of personhood of an
embryo, available cases held that a fetus was not a human life and had no
interests separate from those of its mother.48 If a fetus was not a person
with a right to life, Judge Wall reasoned, an embryo could not possibly
have such a right either.4 9 Judge Wall observed further that even though
issues surrounding the treatment and legal status of embryos were impor-
tant, the fact that neither British nor European law recognized embryos as
human lives made it inappropriate to deal with such questions under Arti-
cle 2 of the Convention.
5 0
C. Article 8 Claim
The question of whether the provisions of the 1990 Act violated
Evans's Article 8 rights to private life proved more complicated.5 1 Accord-
(requiring consent of both donors to storage of the embryos), and 4(1) of Schedule 3
(allowing variation or withdrawal of consent). See also European Convention on Human
Rights arts. 2, 8, 14, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. Additionally, Judge Wall held that
implantation of the embryos in Evans could not constitute treatment "together" after the
couple's breakup and noted that the examination of the implication for a potential
child's welfare required by the 1990 Act could present a potential problem. Evans, 2
W.L.R. at 745. Judge Wall also rejected Evans' argument that by being created and
stored, the embryos had already been "used" and that it was too late to withdraw con-
sent. Judge Wall instead interpreted the creation and storage of the embryos as mere
preparation for use. Id. at 750-51. Evans's promissory estoppel claim also failed to
impress Judge Wall because such an agreement would be unenforceable in any case, and
it was unclear that Evans relied on Johnston's promises (if in fact they were promises at
all) given that no alternative existed for Evans to have a biological child. Id. at 775-79.
These issues did not concern provisions of the European Convention and were not
among those that Evans appealed to the European Court of Human Rights.
46. Evans, 2 W.L.R. at 752.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 752 (citing In re F (in utero) 1988 2 W.L.R. 1288; Paton v. United King-
dom, 3 E.H.R.R. 408 (1980)).
49. Id. at 753.
50. Id. at 753-54.
51. Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights states: "(1) Everyone has
the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence; and
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the coun-
try, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others." European Convention on Human
Rights, art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. Judge Wall regarded private and family
life as two separate matters, with this case only engaging the former, since both Evans
and Johnston were adults living separately and the embryos were not people. Evans, 2
W.L.R. at 754.
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ing to the Secretary of State for Health, policy considerations in favor of
bright-line rules included the promotion of certainty and reduction of liti-
gation in a sensitive area of law. These factors informed the strict consent
rules in the 1990 Act.52 The head of the Department of Health, presenting
these considerations on behalf of the secretary, credited these bright-line
rules with the reduced frequency of this type of litigation as compared to
the United States.
53
Evans's counsel framed the 1990 Act's consent provisions as providing
a "male veto" over the clinic's ability to store the embryos and a woman's
ability to use them. 54 By permitting Johnston's withdrawal of consent to
prevent Evans from using the embryos, the state was interfering with
Evans's private life int a way not justified by the public interest needs
described in Article 8. 5 5 Evans's counsel was willing to regard the regula-
tion of the clinic and the adoption of relevant licensing and treatment stan-
dards for use of the embryo as within the state's legitimate interest, but
counsel maintained that allowing Johnston to order the embryos destroyed
after he had previously consented to their use served no public interest.
56
Evans's counsel also attempted to convince the court that the policy
considerations behind the 1990 Act pointed to a conclusion in favor of
Evans.5 7 First, the policy consideration of allowing women to make their
own determinations in matters of pregnancy dictated that Johnston not be
permitted to withdraw his consent to the use of the embryos. After all,
Evans's counsel argued, if a man's right to consent terminates when the
embryo is created in a natural pregnancy, it should end after the embryo is
created in an IVF pregnancy. 5 8 Second, the policy of furthering the pri-
macy of consent would dictate that Johnston's right to give irrevocable con-
sent, with his intention to do so being indicated by his reassurances to
Evans, be honored by not permitting him to withdraw his consent.
59
Third, the policy of recognizing the special significance of parenthood
would not be diminished by a decision in favor of Evans because men fre-
quently become fathers without their consent, and the only public interest
in whether men became fathers was their financial obligation to care for
the child.60 Fourth, as to the policy of equality between partners, allowing
men to give irrevocable initial consent would not diminish their equality.
6 1
Lastly, as to the policy of furthering certainty between the parties, Evans's
counsel explained that a rule allowing a man to give irrevocable consent
would be just as bright-line as the existing rule, and that in any case being
52. Evans, 2 W.L.R. at 755.
53. Id. at 755.
54. Id. at 756.
55. Id. at 756-57.
56. Id. at 757.
57. Id. at 758.
58. Id.
59. Evans, 2 W.L.R. at 758.
60. Id. at 758-59.
61. Id. at 759.
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a bright-line rule did not automatically make a rule acceptable.
6 2
Additionally, Evans's counsel argued that the 1990 Act's bright-line
rules could not be proportionate protections of the public interest for Arti-
cle 8 purposes because they brooked no exceptions for the special circum-
stances of parties involved.6 3 Evans's counsel focused on Article 8's
requirement that interference with the right to private life needed to be
necessary to protect public interest, claiming that the 1990 Act's consent
provisions did not meet this requirement in Evans's case since there would
have to be necessity to prevent Evans from becoming a mother.
64
Counsel for the Secretary of State for Health noted that situations like
these were precisely those in which the European Court of Human Rights
would grant the state a wide margin of appreciation.6 5 Decisions made by
democratically-elected governments in areas of social policy where no
Europe-wide consensus exists were, according to the secretary's counsel,
precisely the sort of decisions on which state's judgment should receive
deference. 66 He also argued that there was no reason for the male's right to
withdraw consent to terminate at the point of providing semen rather than
at the point of implantation in the woman, particularly since it would be at
the latter point that both a naturally impregnated woman and a woman
impregnated through IVF treatment would be in the same position.
6 7
Moreover, counsel for the secretary argued that just because children are
frequently born against the wishes of their fathers does not mean that this
is a desirable outcome.6 8 Counsel for the Secretary and Johnston further
emphasized the Convention's Article 14 requirement that Convention
rights apply without sex discrimination and that allowing the female gam-
ete donor to have complete control over the fate of the embryo while in
storage would be an inequitable solution compared with the existing rule
allowing the male and female gamete donors an equal opportunity to veto
use of the embryo. 69 Counsel for the secretary also defended the bright-
line consent rule as designed to prevent litigation like this in the future and
to allow parties to IVF treatment as well as treatment providers to be cer-
tain about how rules would apply.70 Evans's personal circumstances of
62. Id.
63. Id. at 760 (citing Regina (Mellor) v. Sec. of State for the Home Dept. [20021 QB
13, 2001 3 W.L.R. 533).
64. Id. at 761-62.
65. Id. at 763 (citing "H" v. Human Fertilisation & Embryology Authority [2002]
EWCA Civ 20). The concept of a "margin of appreciation" in European Court of Human
Rights cases refers to the Court's practice of deferring to the judgment of the domestic
authorities on human rights issues for which no Europe-wide consensus exists. See
Handyside v. United Kingdom, 1 E.H.R.R. 737 (1976). The court commonly invokes
deference in cases involving complex issues of social policy in which the Court believes
that the domestic courts are in a better position to evaluate the issues in light of the
needs of the domestic courts' society. HUMAN RIGHTS 564-66 (Louis Henkin et al. eds.,
1999).
66. Evans, 2 W.L.R. at 763.
67. Id. at 765.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 766-67.
70. Id. at 766.
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wanting to have a child did not outweigh the policy concerns in favor of the
bright-line rule because the effect of the 1990 Act, counsel for the secretary
argued, was to allow Johnston to determine whether he would or would not
be a father, not to deprive Evans of the chance to be a mother.
7 1
Judge Wall found the 1990 Act's interference with Evans's private life
proportionate to the policy goals and necessary to protect Johnston's right
to protection from interference in his private life. 72 In agreeing with the
secretary and Johnston, Judge Wall dismissed Evans's characterization of
Johnston's right to withdraw consent as a "male veto" because she shared
that right with him.73 Wall noted that section 13(5) of the 1990 Act
required consideration of the welfare of any potential child and he did not
relish the possibility of a child having a father who would not play any role
in his or her life aside from providing financial support.74 The weight of
the policy considerations in favor of the bright-line rule persuaded Judge
Wall that Evans's approach of allowing the male gamete donor to provide
only irrevocable consent was inappropriate. 75 Wall further expressed a
preference for deferring to Parliament's judgment in sensitive areas of
law.76
D. Article 12 Claims
Judge Wall quickly dismissed the Article 12 claim because it invoked
many of the same arguments as the Article 8 claim.77 Since Evans's dis-
pute with Johnston did not involve marriage, Judge Wall pointed out that
an Article 12 challenge would require the assumption that the right to start
a family was a guarantee separate from the right to marry.78 Even if he
made that assumption, Judge Wall explained, all the state must guarantee
is the right of access to IVF treatment-not actual access, affordability, or
success-and by establishing the right of access to treatment, the 1990 Act
met the requirements of Article 12.
7 9
E. Article 14 Claims
Judge Wall next examined the claim that the 1990 Act made Evans a
victim of discrimination in violation of Article 14. Evans did not claim that
Article 14 discriminates against women vis-d-vis men, but rather against
women who, because of disability, need IVF treatment to conceive vis-d-vis
women who do not.80 Evans's counsel stated that the differences between
Evans and a naturally pregnant woman, such as the fact that Evans's
71. Id.
72. Id. at 769.
73. Evans, 2 W.L.R. at 767.
74. Id. at 768 (citing Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, c. 37, § 13(5)).
75. Id. at 769.
76. Id. at 769-70.
77. Id. at 770. Article 12 guarantees the right to marry and start a family. European
Convention on Human Rights art. 12, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
78. Evans, 2 W.L.R. at 770.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 770-71.
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embryo was outside the womb while a pregnant woman's embryo would be
inside the womb, did not justify treating Evans differently by allowing the
male gamete donor to order the disposal of the embryo.8 1 The Secretary
countered that this case did not contain three out of the four necessary
elements for an Article 14 discrimination claim.82 The Secretary's counsel
argued that the comparison with a naturally pregnant woman was inappro-
priate because a woman who has become pregnant through an IVF proce-
dure does have the same rights with respect to the embryo.8 3 Evans was
not pregnant with the embryo, however, so there was in fact no difference
in treatment and Evans was not truly in an analogous position.8 4 Moreo-
ver, the Secretary emphasized that the 1990 Act does not differentiate
between disabled women in need of IVF treatment and those who are not
disabled, since non-disabled women using IVF treatment would be subject
to the same regulations; rather, the Act discriminates between men and
women whose partners have withdrawn their consent to use the embryos
and those who have not.85 Judge Wall agreed with the Secretary and dis-
missed all Convention claims.
8 6
II. European Court of Human Rights Case
A. Appeal
Having lost at trial, Evans filed an appeal with the Court of Appeal
8 7
in December of 2003.88 Although one of the three judges on the court
agreed with Evans that in the matter of the Article 14 claim the true compa-
rators were an infertile woman and a fertile woman, she felt that the differ-
ent treatment was nevertheless justified, and the Court of Appeal did not
reverse any of the judgments of Family Division.8 9 In November 2004, the
House of Lords refused Evans's appeal, leaving appeal against the United
81. Id. at 771.
82. Id. at 771-72 (citing Regina (Hooper) v. Sec. of State for Work & Pensions
[2003] 2 EWCA 813, 1 W.L.R. 2623, which provided the following questions to deter-
mine if there has been discrimination: (1) Do the facts fall within one or more of the
substantive Convention provisions? (2) If so, was there different treatment as respects
that right between the complainant on the one hand and other persons put forward for
comparison? (3) Were the chosen comparators in an analogous situation to the com-
plainant's situation? (4) If so, did the different treatment have an objective and reasona-
ble justification? The secretary's counsel said that Evans' case only met the first
criterion).
83. Id. at 772.
84. Id.
85. Evans, 2 W.L.R. at 772.
86. Id.
87. The Court of Appeal of England and Wales hears appeals from the High Court
and several other trial courts. Court of Appeal, http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/
cms/1235.htm.
88. Evans v. Amicus Healthcare Ltd., [20041 EWCA 727, 2004 3 W.L.R. 681, 72
(Eng.).
89. Id. at 103-04.
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Kingdom to the European Court of Human Rights as her final option.90
The European Court of Human Rights considered: (i) whether Evans's
appeal was application was admissible at all; (ii) whether the 1990 Act vio-
lated any Article 2 right to life held by the embryo; (iii) whether the 1990
Act violated Evans's Article 8 right to private life; and (iv) whether Evans
was the victim of discrimination in violation of Articles 8 and 14
together. 9 1 The Court reviewed the relevant portions of the Convention
and briefly surveyed the laws of Europe, the United States, and Israel on
the subject.
9 2
B. Admissibility and Article 2 Claim
Judging that Evank raised sufficiently serious questions of law, the
Court briefly and unanimously dismissed the United Kingdom's argument
that Evans's claim was so manifestly ill-founded that it was inadmissible.
93
The Court also unanimously dismissed Evans's Article 2 claim because the
question of when human life begins was within the government's margin of
appreciation. 94 The United Kingdom did not recognize embryos as human
lives and, therefore, the 1990 Act did not violate Article 2.
9 5
C. Article 8 Claim
A five-to-two majority of the Court found that the 1990 Act was within
the margin of appreciation for the purposes of Article 8.96 In addition to
emphasizing its wide margin of appreciation, the state argued that the
Court had previously decided that bright-line rules in cases like this were
acceptable; 9 7 allowing exceptions in cases like Evans's would frustrate Par-
liament's legitimate policy objective of ensuring bilateral consent to IVF
treatment. 98 Evans admitted that the state had a wide margin of apprecia-
tion in legislating on IVF treatment, but counsel argued that since the state
had decided to permit IVF treatment, it had now moved into an area where
private, rather than public, interests were being balanced. 99 Evans asserted
that because the state chose to intervene in the balancing of private inter-
ests when it did not have to do so, it had to adopt a more flexible scheme
than that offered by the 1990 Act. 100 Evans also factually distinguished
90. Evans, 43 E.H.R.R. at 415. For a case to receive consideration by the European
Court of Human Rights, an applicant must exhaust all possibilities of domestic remedy.
European Court of Human Rights Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 6.
91. Evans, 43 E.H.R.R. at 409-10. The court also ordered that the embryos be pre-
served until the judgment was final.
92. Id. at 419-22.
93. Id. at 423.
94. Id. (citing Vo v. France, 40 E.H.R.R. 12 (2005)).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 410.
97. Id. at 424-25 (citing Odi~vre v. France, 38 E.H.R.R. 43 (2004), which involved
keeping the identity of parents who give children up for adoption secret, and Pretty v.
United Kingdom, 35 E.H.R.R. 1 (2002), which involved the right to die).
98. Evans, 43 E.H.R.R. at 424-25.
99. Id. at 424.
100. Id. at 425.
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the cases in which the Court had previously permitted bright-line rules:
Pretty because it dealt with a large class of claimants, and Odievre because
it involved a more obvious public interest. 10 1
In holding for the state on the Article 8 claim, the Court characterized
Evans's argument as a claim that the margin of appreciation diminishes
when the state is balancing the interests of individuals. 10 2 The Court
stressed that it was deferring to the judgment of domestic authorities in an
area where no European consensus existed and where medical technology
and ethical issues were highly sensitive. 10 3 In such an area, the Court rea-
soned, the margin of appreciation extended to both the regulation of IVF
treatment in general and the intervention in this case in particular. 10 4 The
Court also recounted that the 1990 Act was the result of detailed examina-
tion of the issues by Parliament, which consciously decided to adopt a pol-
icy of allowing parties to withdraw consent up to the point of
implantation. 10 5 The Court also rejected Evans's argument that her case
was distinct from Pretty and Oditvre, and it found that the overriding prin-
ciple from those cases was that states are entitled to enact rules without
exceptions for hard cases so as to ensure that the public could have confi-
dence in the law in difficult circumstances. 10 6 Furthermore, the Court did
not find it self-evident that the man and woman in an IVF consent case
should not be treated equally or that the balancing of interest could not
necessarily fall in favor of the man. 10 7 Rather, the Court acknowledged
that the United Kingdom's courts or Parliament could have balanced the
interests otherwise, as did the Israeli Supreme Court in Nachmani v.
Nachmani, 10 8 but, like many other members of the Council of Europe, it
did not. ' 0 9
D. Article 8 Dissent
Two judges dissented from the Court's judgment on Article 8. First,
the dissenters argued, the Court failed to appreciate that the interests at
stake when the Court endorsed the bright-line rules in Pretty and Odievre
were vastly different from those in this case. 10 They also pointed out that,
in Pretty, the bright-line rule prohibiting assisted suicide was not dispro-
portionate, in part because it provided for flexibility in sentencing."'
Here, the law provided no flexibility. The dissent could not understand
101. Id. at 424-25.
102. Id. at 426-27.
103. Id. at 427-28.
104. Evans, 43 E.H.R.R. at 427-28.
105. Id. at 427-28.
106. Id. at 428.
107. Id. at 428-29.
108. Id. at 429 (citing CA 5587/93 Nachmani v. Nachmani [1995] IsrSC 50(4) P.D.
661, which held in a similar case that the woman's interest in using her last opportunity
to have a biological child outweighed the man's interests).
109. Id. at 429.
110. Id. 431-32.
111. Id. at 432 (citing Pretty, 35 E.H.R.R. at 39).
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why the majority approved a bright-line rule that allowed flexibility in a
case that involved the "right to death," which is not directly guaranteed by
the Convention but only inferred from Article 2, while, with an uncompro-
mising rule, it eliminated the right to be treated with IVF, which the dissent
believed to fall more directly within the ambit of Article 8.112 The dissent
regarded the state's act of prohibiting the implantation of the embryo as
destroying Evans's right to have a child, 113 and the dissenting judges
would have preferred that the Court balance the interests of both Evans
and Johnston. 1 14 The two judges also noted that the clarity and certainty
of a bright-line rule do not excuse the rule if it happens to be a bad one.
1 15
The dissent concluded that a fair balancing of the individual interests in
this case should yield a rule whereby
the interests of the party who withdraws consent and wants to have the
embryos destroyed should prevail (if domestic law so provides), unless the
other party: (a) has no other means to have a genetically-related child; and
(b) has no children at all; and (c) does not intend to have recourse to a
surrogate mother in the process of implantation.
116
E. Article 14 Claim
The Court unanimously did conclude that the 1990 Act did not vio-
late Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8. The Court noted that differ-
ences in treatment that objectively and reasonably were justified were not
discrimination under Article 14, and that states enjoyed a margin of appre-
ciation in determining what differences in circumstances justify differ-
ences in treatment. 1 17 The Court found that the same reasons for
dismissing the Article 8 claim showed that the different treatment objec-
tively was justified. 18
Conclusion
In concluding that (i) the definition of human life is within the margin
of appreciation; (ii) states have a broad margin of appreciation in deciding
how to regulate consent matters in IVF treatment; (iii) states are entitled to
decide that policy considerations justify bright-line rules as opposed to
consideration of individual cases; and (iv) allowing withdrawal of consent
to use IVF embryos is not discrimination against women who rely on IVF
treatment to have a biological child, the European Court of Human Rights
recused itself from the controversy of how long male gamete donors should
have to withdraw their consent to IVF implantation and declined to impose
a uniform solution in an area where domestic courts in different states
112. Evans, 43 E.H.R.R. at 432.
113. Id. at 433.
114. Id. at 433-34.
115. Id. at 435-36.
116. Id. at 426 (italics in original).
117. Id. at 430.
118. Id.
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have balanced the issues differently. Thus, the Court decided not only that
the state has the privilege of regulating IVF treatment but also that the state
can appropriately choose how to balance the conflicting interests of parties
that can arise in such treatment, even at the individual level.
Further, the judgment involves issues in the United Kingdom beyond
those derived directly from the European judgment-particularly because
the domestic courts found the policy concerns involved to be so strong.
The decision involves contract law in the field of reproductive sciences
since the trial and appellate court decisions endorsed by the European
Court have judged the strength of the policy concerns such that they can
override contractual agreements between individuals. Indeed, the courts
have found that policy strong enough to justify its operation in all circum-
stances as a bright-line rule. This decision is bound to have interesting
consequences at both the frontiers of medical science and the law.

